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Abstract
In the last years research on emotion focused on the role of amygdala-orbitofrontal loops in learn-
ing associations between internal states of the organism and external context, and in modulating choice
behaviour. Amygdala is now thought to participate actively in current reward value-response learning.
Furthermore, amygdala seems to act as an effector of choice behaviour elaboration in orbitofrontal cor-
tex. The influence of amygdala-orbitofrontal loop in reward behaviours and choice behaviours probably
passes through its output connections to corticostriatal loop (input from basolateral nuclei of amygdala to
nucleus accumbens). At the same time, amygdala modulates hypothalamus and brain stem arousal and
controls such systems through pathways mainly running from the amygdala’s central nucleus to brain
stem. Habit learning does not require amygdala’s processing. Overall, these findings gives evidence of
the existence of two different systems involved in reward-based behaviour, one more dynamic and related
to the mapping between the actual context and inner states, and the other, more stable and acquired over
long periods of time, relatively independent of actual inners states.
Introduction
Emotions can be viewed as physiological internal reactions of an organism to the inputs of the world,
produced by autonomic brain processes. These processes, mostly taking place in brain stem and hypotha-
lamus, are modulated and controlled by high level telencephalic loops. These high level loops produce
rapresentations of emotions and emotional memory, organizing and elaborating the internal context of
the organism and its relations with the external world context.
There are two central paths in the current research on emotions and motivation. Firstly, there is
the evidence that assigning values to states of the world is a major role played by emotional systems
(Rolls, 2000; Cardinal et al., 2002). These systems are involved in complex context-dependent reward
behaviour production and learning. Behaviours as those related to delayed rewards, or second order con-
ditioning are influenced and suppressed by damage or removal of the neural systems behind emotions.
Thus, emotional systems should emerge from the complex organization of the neural mechanisms un-
derlying reward behaviours, beeing these behaviours the kind of autonomic processes producing internal
reactions. From the other side, physiological internal reactions (emotions) and their representation in
high-level systems (feelings) can be thought of as ’somatic markers’ of the context (Bechara et al., 2003),
be it both actually perceived or neurally represented. In this view, higher cognitive processes are mod-
ulated by the production of these markers. In particular, the association of an emotional reaction to an
external context representation, gives this representation a value. This value is used to inhibit those rep-
resentations that evoke negative emotional states; thus emotional systems act as filters that perform an
inplicit ’pre-selection’ of cthe complex eleboration of higher cognitive processes elaborating future context
alternatives(Bechara et al., 2003). complex elaboration of possible future contexts. As it will be said later
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in this paper, thees two views partly depend from the different level of abstraction that can be used in
research project on this emotions.
The neural substrates of emotional representations elaboration and learning are nowadays thought to
be mainly amygdala and prefrontal cortex (orbitofrontal cortex). While most of previous views of amyg-
dala function emphasised its role in negative emotions such as fear, today there is a lot of evidence the
amygdala has a main role in processing both negative and positive emotions (Baxter and Murray, 2002;
Cardinal et al., 2002; Peciña et al., 2006). Amygdala-associative cortex loops are fundamental in emo-
tional memory (McGaugh, 2004). There are massive reciprocal inputs between the basolateral nuclei
of amygdala and both temporoparietal and prefrontal associative cortex; these underlie associations be-
tween perceived or represented external context processing (inferotemporal high level associative cortex)
and internal states processing (prefrontal and orbitofrontal high level associative cortex). This system of
re-entrant circuits is at the base of the storing and elaboration of representations of emotions (see fig. 1);
in particular it gives current reward value information to a vast range of associative-learning processes.
Orbitofrontal cortex is now recognised as fundamental in social behaviours, choice behaviours, and deci-
sion making.
Baxter and Murray (2002) distinguish mainly two kind of reward processing. The first, independent of
the amygdala, produces stimulus-response learning and affective valence behaviours, and is not sensitive
to changes in current value of reward. This mechanism underlies procedural learning, where conditioned
and instrumental overtrained responses become ’habitual’ and resistant to reinforcer’s devaluation. These
behaviours are thought to depend from corticostriatal loops and object processing in inferotemporal cor-
tex. The other, dependent on the amygdala-orbitofrontal loop, produces goal-oriented behaviours, second
order conditioning, response selection, and choice behaviours. These kind of learning processes need a
representation of reinforcer including its current value. These processes are sensitive to reinforcer deval-
uation.
In the present paper we will focus on the role of each one of these components in learning, choice
behaviour, and decision making.
1 Amygdala-independent reward processing
Baxter and Murray (2002) define five reward behaviour paradigms where behaviour production is not
influenced by amygdala- orbitofrontal processing: discrimination learning, conditional motor learning,
appetitive pavlovian learning, food preferences, object references.
In discrimination learning paradigms monkeys have to choose between two objects, one of them hiding
a food reward (eg. a half-peanut). After several trials monkeys learn to choose the baited object irrespec-
tive of its location. Complete removal of amygdala doesn’t disrupt this behaviour (Burns et al., 1993;
Blundell et al., 2001).
In conditional motor learning subject must learn to associate a stimulus with a motor response. For
example monkeys learn by trials and errors to move a joystick to the right when a blue cube is presented
and to move it to the left when a red one is presented. Here only reward-no reward in past trials guide
future responses. Also in this case complete bilateral removal of amygdala has no affect in learning or
mantaining the task (Murray and Wise, 1996).
Appetitive pavlovian (classic) learning consist in associating an unconditioned stimulus (eg. a tone
or light) to a food reward. After a training phase, presenting the conditioned stimulus (CS) produces
food-related behaviours. These effects remain intact after damage of amdygdala (Hatfield et al., 1996).
While these three learning paradigms all explore some caracteristic of stimulus-response behaviour,
there are other two classes of behaviours that can be still found in subjects with lesions to amygdala.
These are food preferences (stable preference among a set of foods) and object preferences (acquired pref-
erences for objects paired with particular foods). Both these behaviours can be seen as cases of affective
valence (Murray et al., 1996; Málková et al., 1997).
All these five schemes of behaviour are not abolished or lowered in their effects when amygdala pro-
cessing is blocked or impaired. These behaviours can be clustered together to define stimulus-response
habits. S-R habits underlie procedural learning: as the S-R association is direct, there is no represen-
tation of the reinforcer. A rat responding using its habit system, which possesses no information on the
reinforcer, will not alter its rate of responding following reinforcer devaluation.
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2 Amygdala-dependent reward processing
Basolateral amygdala seem to play a fundamental role in associating current reward values to responses
(Baxter and Murray, 2002).
One classical paradigm to explore this effect is reinforcer devaluation. For instance pairing the in-
gestion of a food reinforcer with malaise (induced by injections of lithium chloride) in rats will reduce
subsequent responding to a stimulus (a CS) that has been paired with that food (Hatfield et al., 1996).
The reduction in the value of this reward reduces conditioned responding to a CS indicates that, when
the CS is presented, it evokes a representation of the food reward; because the value of this reward has
been reduced, responding is decreased. This effect is abolished by neurotoxic lesions of the basolateral
but not central amygdala (Hatfield et al., 1996). Another aspect of learning associations between current
reward values and responses is the ability of reward evoked by a stymulus to support new learning. The
learning paradigms to show this behaviour are those of second order conditioning. In such paradigms, a
neutral stimulus is paired directly with a reinforcer and then, this CS, now referred to as the first-order
CS, is paired with a second neutral stimulus, the second-order CS. Itact animals show classical condi-
tioned responding to the second-order CS, even though it has been never directly paired with primary
reinforcement. The first order response can also support the acquisition of an instrumental response. For
example, rats will press a level to gain presentation of the first order CS (the conditioned-reinforcement
procedure). Even in this case, the level press is never (or only rarely) paired with food or any other pri-
mary reinforcer. These phenomena indicate that the first-order CS has has itself acquired reinforcing
power as a consequence of its association with primary reinforcement. However first-order CSs do not
acquire reinforcing power when the basolateral amygdala is removed or inactivated (Setlow et al., 2002).
The interaction of the basolateral amygdala with the nucleus accumbens seems to be essencial for
this type of learning. Furthermore, connection between amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex is needed for
updating reward value information, as seen in experimental crossed disconnection between the two areas
(Baxter and Murray, 2002).
3 The role of nucleus accumbens
Motivational effects of emotionally significant stimuli are mediated in part by the ventral striatum, specif-
ically the nucleus accumbens. While the nucleus accumbens conforms broadly to the pattern of the cortico-
striatal-pallido-thalamo-cortical loop typical of the striatum (Haber et al., 2000), it is a recipient of infor-
mation from a considerable array of limbic strucures (see fig. 2). It receives excitatory glutamatergic
afferents from the thalamus, medial prefrontal cortex, basolateral amygdala, and hippocampus. It then
integrates these afferent inputs and relays the resultant information to motor areas. Nucleus accumbens
shell and core neurons project to specific areas within the substantia nigra, ventral pallidum, hypotha-
lamus, ventral tegmental area, globus palidus and substantia innominata. Nucleus accumbens neurons
have been suggested to regulate the activity of substantia nigra neurons, influencing dopamine release in
the caudate-putamen, and thereby influence the speed or rate at which an action will be carried out via
activation of D2 receptors. Therefore nucleus accumbens acts as an interface between limbic and motor
areas of the brain (Cardinal et al., 2002). It also influences the planning of behavior through its projec-
tions via the ventral pallidum and thalamus to the prefrontal cortex (Russell, 2000). Nucleus accumbens
has a role in modulating unconditioned behaviours such as feeding and locomotion, and learned behaviour
(including instrumental responding). It is the key site to furnish what can be termed incentive salience, a
property that can be showed in autoshaping. Autoshaping consist in associating to a CS the behavioural
effects of reinforcers on intrumental responding. for example, a light is reliably turned on shortly before
rats are given food. The pigeons naturally, unconditionally, come close (unconditioned response) to the
food (unconditioned stimulus) given them, but through learning, conditionally, came to come close (con-
ditioned response) to the light source (conditioned stimulus) that predicts food. This behaviour doesn’t
appear when nucleus accumbens is inpaired. Moreover, the nucleus accumbens appears to support ani-
mals’ ability to work on delayed rewards, acting as an evaluator of current states with respect to future
reward (Cardinal et al., 2002).
From the point of view of the internal circuit of basal ganglia the nucleus accumbens acts as part of an
evaluation system of spatiotemporal states-action pairs. This system is fundamental to confront present
and previous states in search of the future action that match best reward finding (Dayan and Balleine,
2002).
3
A)
Figure 1: A) anatomy and principal con-
nections of amygdala; B) a schematic view
of amygdalo-prefrontal loop; the recipro-
cal connection between amygdala and cor-
tex are the substrate of memory of emo-
tional contexts. abbreviations: MDmc -
mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus, Ca
- caudatum, P - putamen, NAcc - nu-
cleus accumbens, VP -ventral pallidum,
Ce - central nucleus of amygdala, M - me-
dial nucleus of amygdala, PAC - periamyg-
daloid cortex, AB - accessory basal nucleus
of amygdala, B - basal nucleus of amyg-
dala, L - lateral nucleus of amygdala, lat-
eral nnucleus of amygdala, SNr - substan-
tia nigra pars reticulata
B)
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Figure 2: Anatomical disposition of nucleus accumbens in basal ganglia.
It seems as if nucleus accumbens could be the more dynamic part of this value system, because of
its massively interactions with both internal state elaboration processes and external context process-
ing. When overtrained, dynamically changed current values given by accumbens are sobstituted by more
stable acquired value representations activated in corticostriatal loops.
4 The role of Orbitofrontal Cortex
The orbitofrontal cortex (fig. 3) has been widely suggested to guide behaviour based on the anticipated
value of different actions; it is extensively and reciprocally connected to the basolateral nuclei of amyg-
dala (Baxter et al., 2000; Baxter and Murray, 2002). Direct evidence of a functional connection between
Basolateral nuclei of amygdala and Orbitofrontal cortex has been provided by Baxter et al. (2000); who
showed that disconnecting these two structures impaired the ability of reshus monkeys to adjust their
choice behaviour in response to reinforcer devaluation. These data are consistent with the notion that
the orbitofrontal cortex influences intrumental choice behaviour and interacts with value systems in the
amygdala to do so.
Humans with impairment of orbitofrontal cortex fail on a number of tests of emotional reactivity
to stimuli, and make poor decisions as a result; in several respects, they resemble amygdala lesioned
subjects; For example, in the laboratory ’gambling task’ of Bechara et al., subjects choose between decks
of cards; some decks pay out small rewards steadily, with the occasional small loss, for a net gain, while
other decks pay out much larger rewards but the occasional losses are catastrophic. Normal subjects
learn to prefer the safe decks, and develop an autonomic response (including a skin conductance response
SCR) that precedes their choice and is especially pronounced when they are about to choose a ’risky’ deck.
Orbitofrontal cortex-lesioned patients do not develop anticipatory SCRs and consistently perform poorly
on the task (Bechara, 2004). Damasio have suggested that these autonomic responses represent ’somatic
markers’, a rapidly retrieved utility signal that normally acts to speed up and improve decision making
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Figure 3: Anatomical disposition of
orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala.
by ’pre-biasing’ other, computationally intensive cognitive systems, preventing them from considering
particularly bad courses of action (Bechara, 2004).
Rolls (Rolls, 1999) proposes a different hypothesis, according to which the orbitofrontal cortex is in-
volved in emotion because it represents the reward and punishment value of primary (unlearned) rein-
forcing stimuli, and because it is involved in the rapid relearning and reversal of associations between
previously neutral stimuli and primary reinforcers. According to Rolls this means that the impairments
in patients with orbitofrontal cortex lesions are related to deficits in responding to primary reinforcers,
and in reversing reinforcement-related associations when the contingencies change (a type of stimulus-
stimulus learning), and not to the inability to inhibit a previously learnt motor response. This theory
is well supported by the neurophysiological evidence from non-human primates, the orbitofrontal cortex
does appear to be crucially involved in representing and altering the reward value of primary and sec-
ondary reinforcers as incorporated into the theory of emotion and its brain mechanisms put forward by
Rolls (Rolls, 1999, 2000).
These two views of how orbitofrontal cortex influences processing of emotion come with two kind of
evidences: the first group base their hipothesis on research with uman subjects on high level social be-
haviours, while the others support their theory with a wide range of experimental data from animal
reward behaviour paradigms. One solution could be that the same kind of phenomena are view from
two different point of view, that is at two different levels of behaviour complexity. Trying to put the two
hypothesis on the same ground, perhaps ’somatic markers’ could be viewed as context representations
acting as reinforcers in the same way as object representations of food or other kind of explicit rewards.
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Figure 4: Schema of the principal connections of nucleus accumbens. This structure connects amygdala-
refrontal and hippocampal loops with activity in the basal ganglia. arrowheads - excitation; T-bars -
inhibition; squareheads - modulation
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5 Hypotesis for a computational model
In this section we sketch a computational model of the role of nucleus accumbens. The core is the basal
ganglia actor-critic model (Houk et al., 1998). In this model the pathway from sriatal striosomes to ex-
ternal pallidum and from here to substantia nigra pars compacta forms the evaluator-critic component.
This component assigns evaluations to perceived states of the world, and computes differences of evalu-
ations between states (surprice), and through this modulates all striatal activation. The pathway from
striatal matrix to internal pallidum and then to thalamus forms the actor component that selects action,
on the basis of dopamine signal arriving from the critic. We add to this model the evidence that nucleus
accumbens learns to play a major role in the evaluator-critic system, receiving principally two kinds of
input: from hippocampus and from amygdala (fig. 4). In particular, the input from amygdala could be
the main pathway of influence of emotional processes in reinforcing action selection patterns, for example
the dynamic valence of primary rewards. Of course this model is only sketched here and it needs further
work to achieve an implementable state.
6 Conclusions
It seems there exist two kind of processes behind reward behaviours: one is based on the continous
syncronization between states of the world and the internal context; this system is dynamic as far as
it mediates delayed reinforcement, underlies second order reinforcement, it is sensitive to devaluation
of rewards an so on. The other makes use of stable acquired reward representations that are formed
mainly after a long experience of the previous class of processes. This second system implements habit
and procedural learning that does not need a complex representation of reward including actual value.
The first system makes use of two memory processes: one based on hippocampus, that can be viewed
as a ’cognitive’ working memory as it assembles continous information from all multimodal associative
cortexes to create multidimentional internal rappresentations; the other based on the amygdala, an ’emo-
tional’ memory where internal states can be associated with external context.
The second system is implemented in the cortico-striatal-pallido-thalamo-cortical loop of basal ganglia
and is the base for action selection and goal oriented behaviours.
Nucleus Accumbens, having three main paths of input from amygdala, hippocampus and prefrontal
cortex, is the best candidate for the role of the main interface between these two systems.
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